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Abstract
Hypothesis testing is an essential statistical method in psychology and the cognitive sciences. The problems of
traditional null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) have been discussed widely, and among the proposed solutions
to the replication problems caused by the inappropriate use of significance tests and p-values is a shift towards Bayesian
data analysis. However, Bayesian hypothesis testing is concerned with various posterior indices for significance and
the size of an effect. This complicates Bayesian hypothesis testing in practice, as the availability of multiple Bayesian
alternatives to the traditional p-value causes confusion which one to select and why. In this paper, we compare various
Bayesian posterior indices which have been proposed in the literature and discuss their benefits and limitations. Our
comparison shows that conceptually not all proposed Bayesian alternatives to NHST and p-values are beneficial, and
the usefulness of some indices strongly depends on the study design and research goal. However, our comparison also
reveals that there exist at least two candidates among the available Bayesian posterior indices which have appealing
theoretical properties and are, to our best knowledge, widely underused among psychologists.
Keywords
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Introduction
Hypothesis testing is a standard statistical method widely
adopted in psychological research. Historically, the last
century has included the advent of various proposals to
test research hypotheses statistically (Howie, 2002; Mayo,
2018). The most well-known approaches include the theory
of significance testing of British statistician Ronald Fisher
(Fisher, 1925) and the anglo-polish Neyman-Pearson theory
of hypothesis testing (Neyman & Pearson, 1933). While the
former interprets the p-values as a continuous quantitative
measure against the null hypothesis, the latter is targeted
at bounding the type I error rate to a specific test level
α while simultaneously minimising the type II error rate.
In the Neyman-Pearson theory p-values are interpreted as
binary values which either show the significance of a result or
do not. Conceptually, however, both approaches are located
in the frequentist school of thought (Howie, 2002; Nuzzo,
2014).
The problems of frequentist hypothesis testing, in general,
have been detailed and discussed widely in recent years
(Colquhoun, 2014; Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016; Colquhoun,
2017; Benjamin et al., 2018; Wasserstein et al., 2019;
Benjamin & Berger, 2019). One of the largest problems
of frequentist hypothesis testing is its conflict with the
likelihood principle, which has a nearly axiomatic role
in statistical science (Cox, 1958; Birnbaum, 1962; Basu,
1975). Among the consequences of this conflict are the
inability to use optional stopping (that is, stop recruiting
study participants when the data already show overwhelming
evidence and report the results) (Edwards et al., 1963),
problems with the interpretation of censored data which
often are observed in psychological research (Berger &
Wolpert, 1988) and the dependency of the results on the
researcher’s intentions (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b).
The range of proposals which have been made to solve the
problems of NHST and p-values is huge. These proposals
include stricter thresholds for stating statistical significance
(Benjamin et al., 2018), recommendations on how to
improve the use of p-values in practice (Benjamin & Berger,
2019) and more serious methodological shifts (Rouder,
2014; Morey et al., 2016b; Morey et al., 2016a; Kruschke
& Liddell, 2018b). Among the latter, the shift towards
Bayesian statistics as an attractive alternative is proposed
often, in particular, to improve the situation in psychology
(Wagenmakers et al., 2010; Dienes, 2011; Dienes, 2014).
Even when putting the problems of NHST and p-values
aside for a moment and considering a wider timeframe,
Bayesian statistics’ popularity in psychology has grown.
Van de Schoot et al. (2017) conducted a large systematic
review of n = 1579 Bayesian psychologic articles published
in the years between 1990 and 2015. According to them,
Bayesian statistics has become increasingly popular among
psychologists and “Bayesian statistics is used in a variety
of contexts across subfields of psychology and related
disciplines.” (Van De Schoot et al., 2017, p. 1). Furthermore,
they noted that
“There are many different reasons why one
might choose to use Bayes (e.g., the use of
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priors, estimating otherwise intractable models,
modeling uncertainty, etc.). We found in this
review that the use of Bayes has increased and
broadened in the sense that this methodology
can be used in a flexible manner to tackle many
different forms of questions.”
(Van De Schoot et al., 2017, p. 1)
For a good review of why and how Bayesian statistics
improves the reliability of psychological science see Dienes
(2018). For a less optimistic perspective and criticism
on Bayes factor based hypothesis testing in psychological
research see Tendeiro and Kiers (Tendeiro & Kiers, 2019).
Maybe the most important reason why Bayesian statistics
(including Bayesian hypothesis testing) may be preferable
to classic significance testing is its accordance with the
likelihood principle. This implies that results do not depend
on researchers’ intentions, optional stopping is allowed
and interpretation of censored data is simplified (Berger &
Wolpert, 1988; Rouder, 2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2016;
Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b).
In Bayesian data analysis, inference is concerned with
the posterior distribution p(θ|x) after observing the data
x. To obtain this posterior distribution, a prior distribution
p(θ) is assumed for the unknown parameter θ, and the prior
distribution is updated via the model likelihood p(x|θ) to the
posterior distribution:
p(θ|x) ∝ p(x|θ)p(θ) (1)
Here, ∝ means proportional to and in practice it suffices to
obtain a quantity proportional to the posterior p(θ|x) due
to modern sampling algorithms which are used to obtain
the posterior p(θ|x) in practice (Robert & Casella, 2004;
Carpenter et al., 2017; McElreath, 2020).
However, Bayesian statistics also has limitations and
some aspects pose serious challenges to practitioners. For a
thorough review of these problems we refer to Tendeiro &
Kiers (2019), and here we list only three important issues.
First, among the challenges of applying Bayesian data
analysis in practice is the selection of the prior distribution
p(θ). Extreme choices of prior distributions can distort the
obtained results, yield unrealistic parameter estimates, or
even influence the obtained posterior estimates into a desired
direction (Kelter, 2020a; Gabry & Goodrich, 2020).
Second, obtaining the posterior distribution p(θ|x) can
become computationally expensive, in particular when the
statistical model is high-dimensional and massive amounts
of data are observed (Magnusson et al., 2019). However,
this limitation is a less severe problem due to the advent
of modern sampling algorithms like Markov-Chain-Monte-
Carlo (MCMC) (Robert & Casella, 2008; Diaconis, 2009)
and, in particular, Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) (Neal,
2011; Carpenter et al., 2017; Kelter, 2020b).
Third, concerning Bayesian hypothesis testing as a
replacement or alternative to NHST and p-values, there exist
a variety of posterior indices which have been proposed
in the statistics literature (Makowski et al., 2019a; Kelter,
2020a). Conceptually, these posterior indices are all based
on the posterior distribution p(θ|x) im some form, and are
employed to test a null hypothesis like H0 : θ = θ0 against
the alternativeH1 : θ 6= θ0 (or against a one-sided alternative
H1 : θ < 0 or H1 : θ > 0). The mathematical theory behind
each of the proposed posterior indices differs substantially,
and examples include the Bayes factor (Jeffreys, 1961;
Kass & Raftery, 1995; Morey et al., 2016a; Held & Ott,
2018), the region of practical equivalence (ROPE) (Westlake,
1976; Kirkwood & Westlake, 1981; Kruschke & Liddell,
2018b; Kruschke, 2018), the MAP-based p-value (Mills,
2017), the probability of direction (PD) (Makowski et al.,
2019a) and the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) and
the e-value (Pereira & Stern, 1999; Pereira et al., 2008; Stern
& Pereira, 2020). While there are some results available
which compare the available posterior indices for settings
like linear regression (Makowski et al., 2019a) or parametric
two-sample tests (Kelter, 2020a), in general, the suitability of
a given posterior index for testing a hypothesis depends both
on the study design and research goal, see Kelter (2020a).
In this paper, we focus on the third problem and provide
a conceptual comparison of the most widely used Bayesian
posterior indices for hypothesis testing, discuss the benefits
and limitations of each index and give guidance for when to
apply which posterior index. We do not limit the discussion
to a specific method of choice like regression models or the
analysis of variance, because most of the proposed indices
are widely applicable and the limitations and benefits of each
posterior index apply independently of the statistical model
considered. However, to foster understanding and highlight
the practical relevance we use a running example and apply
each index discussed to it after giving a theoretical review
of the index. This way, readers can get familiar with how
the different posterior indices work and get a feeling of how
they differ in a practical setting. As a running example, we
use the Bayesian two-sample t-test of Rouder et al. (2009),
which provides the posterior distribution p(δ|x) of the effect
size δ (Cohen, 1988) after observing the data x.
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, the running
example is presented which builds the foundation for the
application of any posterior index in the second step.
Second, various available posterior indices are introduced,
their benefits and limitations are discussed and they are
applied to the running example. These include the Bayes
factor (Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Morey et al.,
2016a; Held & Ott, 2018), the region of practical equivalence
(ROPE) (Westlake, 1976; Kirkwood & Westlake, 1981;
Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b; Kruschke, 2018), the MAP-
based p-value (Mills, 2017), the probability of direction
(PD) (Makowski et al., 2019a) and the Full Bayesian
Significance Test (FBST) and the e-value (Pereira & Stern,
1999; Pereira et al., 2008; Stern & Pereira, 2020). Third, a
detailed discussion and comparison are provided. Finally, we
conclude by giving guidance on how to select between the
available posterior indices in practice, where it is shown that
the choice of a posterior index depends on both the study
design and research goal.
Running example
As mentioned above, the Bayesian two-sample t-test of
Rouder et al. (2009) is used as a running example in this
paper. The test assumes normally distributed data in both
groups and employs a Cauchy prior C(0, γ) on the effect
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size δ, that is p(δ) = C(0, γ). Using Markov-Chain-Monte-
Carlo (MCMC) sampling, the posterior distribution p(δ|x)
can be obtained, which then subsequently can be used for
Bayesian hypothesis testing via a posterior index. Widely
used choices of γ include
√
2/2, 1 and
√
2, which correspond
to a medium, wide and ultrawide prior. Here, the wide prior
p(θ) = C(0, 1) is used, which places itself between the two
other more extreme options. Note that we do not discuss prior
selection extensively here, but in general, the two-sample
t-test of Rouder et al. (2009) is quite robust to the prior
selection, for details see Kelter (2020a).
In the example, n = 50 observations are used in both
groups, and data in the first group is simulated from a
N (2.51, 1.81) normal distribution, and data in the second
group is simulated from aN (1.72, 1.51) normal distribution.
As a consequence, the true effect size δt according to Cohen
(1988) is given as
δt :=
(2.71− 1.71)√
(1.812 + 1.512)/2
≈ 0.60 (2)
which equals the existence of a medium effect. Figure 2
shows the posterior distribution p(δ|x) of the effect size δ
based on the wide Cauchy prior C(0, 1) after observing the
simulated data of both groups. Clearly, the distribution is
shifted away from δ = 0, but it also does not centre strongly
around the true value δt = 0.60. This can be attributed both
to the amount of data observed and to the randomness
in simulation. The vertical blue line shows the resulting
posterior mean of δ, which equals δ = 0.42.
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Figure 1. Prior-posterior plot for the effect size of the
two-sample Bayesian t-test in the running example. Dashed line
shows the prior distribution p(δ) = C(0, 1), which is a wide
Cauchy prior distribution. Solid line shows the posterior
distribution p(δ|x) after observing the data x in both groups.
The vertical blue line is located at the posterior mean of δ,
which is 0.31.
However, by now no posterior index has been employed
to test the null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 against the alternative
H1 : δ 6= 0. Based on the true effect size δt = 0.60, any
Bayesian posterior index should reject the null hypothesis
H0 : δ = 0 in favour of the alternative H1 : δ 6= 0, or even
accept the alternative hypothesis H1 : δ 6= 0 if possible.
All analyses and results including the figures shown in
this manuscript can be reproduced via the replication script
provided at the Open Science Foundation under https:
//osf.io/xnfb2/.
Bayesian posterior indices
This section discusses the various available posterior indices
for testing a hypothesis in the Bayesian paradigm. The
underlying theory, benefits and limitations of each index are
detailed and afterwards, the index is applied to the running
example shown in figure 2.
The Bayes factor
The Bayes factor (BF) is one of the oldest and still
widely used indices for testing a hypothesis in the Bayesian
approach. It was invented by Sir Harold Jeffreys (1931,
1961) and compares the predictive ability of two competing
models corresponding to each of the hypotheses H0 and
H1 under consideration. The Bayes factor BF01 can be
interpreted as the predictive updating factor which measures
the change in relative beliefs about both hypotheses H0 and
H1 after observing the data x:
P(H0|x)
P(H1|x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior odds
=
p(x|H0)
p(x|H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BF01(x)
· P(H0)
P(H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior odds
(3)
Phrased differently, the Bayes factor BF01 is the ratio of
the two marginal likelihoods p(x|H0) and p(x|H1), each of
which is calculated by integrating out the respective model
parameters according to their prior distribution. Generally,
the calculation of these marginals can be complex in realistic
models (Rubin, 1984; Held & Sabane´s Bove´, 2014).
However, there exist sophisticated numerical techniques
to obtain a Bayes factor in practice even for models
which are analytically difficult to handle. Examples are
bridge sampling (Gronau et al., 2017; Gronau et al., 2019)
or the Savage-Dickey density ratio (Dickey & Lientz,
1970; Verdinelli & Wasserman, 1995), which have become
increasingly popular among psychologists (Wagenmakers
et al., 2010).
Considering the setting of the Bayesian two-sample t-test
in the running example, the Bayes factor is employed to test
the null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 of no effect against a the two-
sided alternativeH1 : δ 6= 0 (one-sided alternativesH1 : δ >
0 or H1 : δ < 0 are of course also possible, but here we
focus on a two-sided alternative). Here, δ = (µ1 − µ2)/σ is
the well-known effect size of (Cohen, 1988, p. 20), under
the assumption of two independent samples and identical
standard deviation σ in each group.
An appealing property of the Bayes factor is its ability
to state evidence both for the null hypothesis H0 and the
alternative H1. In contrast, traditional p-values can only
signal evidence against the null hypothesis H0. However, in
practice, researchers are often not only interested in rejecting
a null hypothesis H0. When rejecting such a hypothesis, the
natural question which follows is: How large is the true effect
size δt, when the evidence against H0 : δ = 0 is substantial
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so that one would reject the hypothesis that no effect exists?
While a p-value was not designed to answer such a question,
the Bayes factor BF01 quantifies the necessary change in
beliefs and can provide this information. If BF01 > 1, the
data indicate a necessary change in beliefs towards the null
hypothesisH0. If on the other handBF01 < 1, the data show
evidence for the alternative H1. Notice that from equation
(3), the relationship BF01 = 1/BF10 holds.
WhileBF01 = 1 is a natural threshold to separate between
evidence for the null and the alternative hypothesis, it is more
difficult to interpret different magnitudes of the Bayes factor.
Over the last century, various scales have been proposed
which translate given magnitudes of the Bayes factor into
evidence. The oldest one is the scale of Jeffreys himself
(Jeffreys, 1931; Jeffreys, 1961), and other proposals have
been made by Kass & Raftery (1995), Goodman (1999),
Lee and Wagenmakers (2013), Held and Ott (2016) and van
Doorn et al. (2019). Table 1 gives an overview about the
different scales and shows that these differ only slightly.1
As a consequence, translating a given Bayes factor into a
statement about the provided evidence is, therefore, a less
severe problem in practice.
For example, according to table 1, a Bayes factor BF01 =
1/5 can be interpreted as moderate evidence against the
null hypothesis H0 relative to the alternative hypothesis H1
when the scale of Held & Ott (2016) is used. Using the
relationship BF01 = 1/BF10, one obtains BF10 = 5, and
the Bayes factor BF10 = 5 indicates a necessary change
in beliefs towards H1. Again, this highlights the appealing
property of Bayes factors that it is always possible to express
the evidence for a research hypothesis, in contrast to p-values
which can only reject a null hypothesis. Bayes factors can be
used to confirm a research hypothesis under consideration.
However, an often lamented problem with the Bayes factor
as discussed by Kamary et al. (2014) and Robert (2016) is
its dependence on the prior distributions which are assigned
to the model parameters. While this criticism is valid,
modern software like JASP (JASP Team, 2019; van Doorn
et al., 2019) enables researchers to use so-called robustness
analyses which show how the resulting Bayes factor changes
when the prior distribution is varied. Using such robustness
analyses, it is possible to check if the resulting Bayes factor
is highly unstable or if the prior assumptions have little effect
on the magnitude of the obtained Bayes factor.
To apply the Bayes factor in the running example, there
are two options: First, it is possible to use a closed-
form expression to calculate the Bayes factor based on the
observed data x. For details, see Rouder et al. (2009). The
resulting Bayes factor is BF01 = 0.6870, which according
to table 1 does not signal evidence against H0. The Bayes
factor for H1, given as BF10 = 1.4556 shows that the
evidence against H0 is also bare worth mentioning. In
summary, the Bayes factor indicates that data is indecisive
in the running example.
A second option to obtain the Bayes factor numerically
is the Savage-Dickey density ratio method (Dickey &
Lientz, 1970; Verdinelli & Wasserman, 1995). A concise
introduction for the Savage-Dickey density ratio for
psychologists is given by Wagenmakers et al. (2010). The
Savage-dickey density ratio states that the Bayes factorBF01
can be obtained numerically as the ratio of the posterior
density’s value at δ0 and the prior density’s value at δ0:
BF01 =
p(δ0|x,H1)
p(δ0, H1)
(4)
In general, this relationship holds for any parameter θ
of interest, and in the running example the parameter of
interest is the effect size δ. In the running example one
obtains for δ0 = 0 the values p(δ0|x,H1) = 0.2171 and
p(delta0|H1) = 0.3183 so that BF01 = 0.2171/0.3183 =
0.6821, which is very close to the analytically obtained
Bayes factor of BF01 = 0.6870.
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Figure 2. Prior-posterior plot for the effect size of the
two-sample Bayesian t-test in the running example. Dashed line
shows the prior distribution p(δ) = C(0, 1), which is a wide
Cauchy prior distribution. Solid line shows the posterior
distribution p(δ|x) after observing the data x in both groups.
The Savage-Dickey density ratio is visualised by the red and
blue points: The Bayes factor BF01 is the ratio of the posterior
density’s height (red point) and the prior density’s height (blue
point) at the null value δ0 = 0.
In summary, the Bayes factor is an appealing option to test
hypotheses in the Bayesian paradigm. It can state evidence
both for the null and the alternative hypothesis, robustness
analyses prevent the results to be highly dependent on
the prior assumptions made, and calculations for most
standard models used in psychological research are either
straightforward or obtained via numerical methods like the
Savage-Dickey density ratio. Notice that it is also possible to
obtain posterior probabilities of each hypothesis explicitly
via equation (3). These aspects contribute to the fact that
the Bayes factor is already widely used among mathematical
psychologists (Hoijtink et al., 2019) and has influenced
scientific practice in psychology (Dienes, 2016; Scho¨nbrodt
et al., 2017). However, the dependence on the parameter
prior distributions and computational difficulties to obtain
1Notice that Jeffreys (1961) used the cut points (1/
√
10)a with a =
1, 2, 3, 4, and Goodman (1999) used 1/5, 1/10, 1/20 and 1/100 for
weak, moderate, moderate to strong and strong to very strong, which have
been aligned with the cut points in the left column of table 1 to simplify
comparison of the different scales.
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Table 1. Categorization of Bayes factors BF01 ≤ 1 into evidence against H0
Bayes factor Strength of evidence against H0
(Jeffreys, 1961) (Goodman, 1999) (Held & Ott, 2016) (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013)
1 to 1/3 Bare mention Weak Anecdotal
1/3 to 1/10 Substantial Weak to moderate Moderate Moderate
1/10 to 1/30 Strong Moderate to strong Substantial Strong
1/30 to 1/100 Very strong Strong Strong Very strong
1/100 to 1/300 Decisive Very strong Very strong Extreme
< 1/300 Decisive
the marginal likelihoods are disadvantages of the Bayes
factor (Tendeiro & Kiers, 2019).
The region of practical equivalence (ROPE)
The Bayes factor was designed to test a precise hypothesis
H0 : θ = θ0, where θ0 is the value of interest. The
increasing reproducibility problems of frequentist hypothesis
tests and p-values in psychology led Cumming (2014) to
propose a shift from hypothesis testing to estimation under
uncertainty. Instead of testing a precise hypothesis H0 :
θ = θ0 via a significance test which employs p-values,
he advocated calculating interval estimates like confidence
intervals instead. The plausibility of a hypothesis H0 : θ =
θ0 is subsequently judged by the uncertainty of the interval
estimate: If the null hypothesis parameter θ0 is included
in the confidence interval, H0 cannot be rejected. If θ0 is
located outside of the confidence interval, one can reject
H0. Cumming (2014) additionally included in his proposal
a focus on “estimation based on effect sizes” (Cumming,
2014, p. 7) instead of p-values and hypothesis tests, see also
Greenland et al. (2016).
This shift was proposed originally from frequentist
hypothesis testing to frequentist estimation and dubbed the
’New Statistics’. Conceptually, the idea is appealing, and
such a process is indeed observed across multiple scientific
domains by now (Wasserstein, Schirm & Lazar, 2019).
Also, such a shift towards an estimation-oriented perspective
embraces uncertainty instead of the dichotomous separation
of research results via p-values into significant and non-
significant findings. This is closely related to one of the
six principles for properly interpreting p-values which were
stated in the 2016 statement of the American Statistical
Association to the reproducibility crisis. It underlined that
a p-value “does not measure the size of an effect or the
importance of a result.” (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016, p. 132).
Instead, the original proposal of Cumming (2014) focusses
on effect sizes and estimation instead of hypothesis testing.
Kruschke & Liddell (2018b) proposed a similar shift
towards estimation under uncertainty from a Bayesian
perspective. They argued that as frequentist interval
estimates like confidence intervals are obtained by inverting
a frequentist hypothesis test (Casella & Berger, 2002),
the problems inherent to significance testing via p-values
are inherited by confidence intervals. As a consequence,
confidence intervals as quantities for estimation are “highly
sensitive to the stopping and testing intentions.” (Kruschke
& Liddell, 2018b, p. 184), while Bayesian interval estimates
due to the accordance of Bayesian statistics with the
likelihood principle are not. To avoid these problems,
Kruschke & Liddell (2018b) argued that the shift originally
proposed by Cumming (2014) can be achieved easier by
Bayesian data analysis.
Next to preferring Bayesian instead of frequentist interval
estimates for such a shift, Kruschke & Liddell (2018a)
argued that precise hypothesis testing as achieved via
the Bayes factor is not suitable in a variety of realistic
research settings. Examples include exploratory research,
measurements which include a substantial amount of error,
and in general complex phenomena in which a precise
hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 at best can be interpreted as an
approximation to reality (Berger & Sellke, 1987; Good,
1988; Berger et al., 1997). For example, Rouder et al. (2009)
argued:
“It is reasonable to ask whether hypothesis
testing is always necessary. In many ways,
hypothesis testing has been employed in
experimental psychology too often and too
hastily (...). To observe structure, it is often
sufficient to plot estimates of appropriate
quantities along with measures of estimation
error (Rouder & Morey, 2005). As a rule of
thumb, hypothesis testing should be reserved
for those cases in which the researcher will
entertain the null as theoretically interesting and
plausible, at least approximately.”
(Rouder et al., 2009, p. 235)
Notice that in the frequentist approach, precise hypothesis
testing can be interpreted as null hypothesis significance
testing, and the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 then precisely
states that θ = θ0. In the Bayesian paradigm, the same idea is
sometimes called sharp hypothesis testing (Pereira, Stern &
Wechsler, 2008). Conceptually, both names identify the same
practice. However, in psychological research the assumption
of a precise effect is highly questionable as Berger et al.
(1997) noted:
“The decision whether or not to formulate
an inference problem as one of testing a
precise null hypothesis centers on assessing the
plausibility of such an hypothesis. Sometimes
this is easy, as in testing for the presence
of extrasensory perception, or testing that a
proposed law of physics holds. Often it is less
clear. In medical testing scenarios, for instance,
it is often argued that any treatment will have
some effect, even if only a very small effect,
and so exact equality of effects (between, say,
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a treatment and a placebo) will never occur.”
(Berger, Brown & Wolpert, 1994, p. 145)
Based on these ideas, Kruschke & Liddell (2018a)
considered approximate hypothesis testing instead of precise
hypothesis testing. To facilitate the shift to an estimation-
oriented perspective in the veins of Cumming (2014), they
proposed the region of practical equivalence (ROPE). The
ROPE unites a concept which appears under different
names in various scientific areas, ‘including “interval of
clinical equivalence”, “range of equivalence”, “equivalence
interval”, “indifference zone”, “smallest effect size of
interest,” and “good-enough belt” ...’ (Kruschke & Liddell,
2018b, p. 185), where these terms come from a wide
spectrum of scientific contexts, see Carlin & Louis (2009),
Freedman et al. (1983), Hobbs & Carlin (2007), Lakens
(2014, 2017) and Schuirmann (1987). The general idea
of all these concepts is to establish a region of practical
equivalence around the null value θ0 of the null hypothesis
H0 : θ = θ0, which expresses “the range of parameter
values that are equivalent to the null value for current
practical purposes.” (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b, p. 185).
To test hypotheses via the ROPE and a Bayesian interval
estimate, the highest posterior density (HPD) interval,
Kruschke (2018) proposed the following decision rule:
• Reject the null value θ0 specified by H0 : θ = θ0, if
the 95% HPD falls entirely outside the ROPE.
• Accept the null value, if the 95% HPD falls entirely
inside the ROPE.
If the 95% HPD falls entirely outside the ROPE, the
parameter value is not inside the ROPE with more than 95%
posterior probability, and as a consequence not practically
equivalent to the null value θ0. A rejection of the null value
θ0 and the corresponding hypothesis then seems reasonable.
If the 95% HPD falls entirely inside the ROPE, the
parameter value is located inside the ROPE with at least
95% posterior probability. As a consequence, it is practically
equivalent to the null value θ0 and it is reasonable to accept
the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0.
Formally, the decision rule can be derived as a Bayes rule
(Held & Sabane´s Bove´, 2014) for a specific choice of a loss
function. Also, the decision based on the HPD and ROPE
approach to Bayesian hypothesis testing is asymptotically
consistent. For details, see the supplement file in Kruschke
(2018).2 Also, the decision rule is described in more detail
in Kruschke et al. (Kruschke et al., 2012; Kruschke &
Vanpaemel, 2015) and Kruschke & Liddell (Kruschke &
Liddell, 2018a).
At first, using the ROPE in combination with a Bayesian
posterior distribution seems appealing. However, there are
two limitations which have prevented more widespread use
in psychological research by now:
(1) Hypothesis testing based on the ROPE and HPD
interval is only possible in situations where scientific
standards of practically equivalent parameter values
exist and are widely accepted by the research
community.
(2) The ROPE only measures the concentration of the
posterior’s probability mass, but fails to measure
evidence once the entire HPD is located inside or
outside the ROPE.
The first limitation is less severe, as for a variety of
quantities there exist widely accepted standards on how to
interpret different magnitudes. Examples are given by effect
sizes, which are categorised in psychology, for example,
according to Cohen (1988). A widely accepted ROPE R
around a null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 for the effect size
δ is given as R = [−0.1, 0.1] (Makowski, Ben-Shachar,
Chen & Lu¨decke, 2019a; Kelter, 2020a). The boundaries
δ = −0.1 and δ = 0.1 are precisely half of the magnitude
necessary for at least a small effect according to Cohen
(1988). Similar proposals for default ROPEs have been
made for logistic and linear regression models. There, a
standard ROPE is |β| ≤ 0.05 for regression coefficients, see
(Kruschke, 2018, p. 277). These default values are justified
both by mathematical theory and official guidelines. The
default ROPEs above are inspired by the recommendations
of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research and Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research (2001). Also, they are based on
the official guidelines of the Center for Veterinary Research
(2016) and the recommendations of the Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research (2016).
Additionally, the default ROPEs behave similarly to the
Bayes factor in practice as shown by Makowski et al. (2019a)
and Kelter (2020a).
In summary, there exist theoretically justified default
values for determining the boundaries of the ROPE for
widely used parameters in psychological research (Westlake,
1976; Kirkwood & Westlake, 1981; Lakens, 2017; Kruschke,
2018; Makowski et al., 2019a; Kelter, 2020a) making the
ROPE and HPD approach a considerable alternative method
for Bayesian hypothesis testing.
The second problem is more severe, as the ROPE
cannot separate between two situations in which the HPD
has concentrated entirely inside the ROPE. However, the
concentration around the null value θ0 may be much more
apparent in one case, while in the other the HPD boundaries
coincide with the ROPE boundaries, stating much less
evidence for the null hypothesis. The same situation holds
when the HPD is located entirely outside the ROPE.
In the running example, figure 3 shows the situation using
the default ROPE R = [−0.1, 0.1] around the effect size null
value δ0 = 0. The 95% HPD interval ranges from δ = 0.03
to δ = 0.80, and therefore is not located entirely outside
the ROPE R. As a consequence, the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected. Notice that when considering the amount of
posterior probability mass located inside the ROPE R, only
3.16% are located inside the ROPER. Choosing a 90% HPD
interval instead in combination with the ROPE R would lead
to the rejection of H0 : δ = 0.
2Formally, Kruschke (2018) avoided the expression hypothesis testing
when using the ROPE and HPD approach, as the goal is estimation under
uncertainty and not precise hypothesis testing. We agree, and when we
use the phrase hypothesis testing here in connection with the ROPE, we
always mean approximate hypothesis testing, which questions the use of
precise hypothesis testing in a variety of research settings and emphasises
estimation over testing.
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Figure 3. The ROPE and HPD approach for the effect size δ of
the two-sample Bayesian t-test in the running example. The
vertical red lines show the boundaries of the ROPE
R = [−0.1, 0.1], and the blue interval is the 95% HPD interval.
The blue shaded area corresponds to the posterior probability
mass inside the 95% HPD, and from the figure it is clear that
only a tiny amount of probability mass (3.16%) is located inside
the ROPE R.
The MAP-based p-value
The MAP-based p-value was proposed by Mills (2017), and
is the ratio of the posterior densities null value p(θ0) and the
posterior densities maximum a posteriori (MAP) value:
pMAP =
p(θ0|x)
arg max
θ∈Θ
p(θ|x)
The idea is based on the likelihood ratio used in the Neyman-
Pearson theory (Neyman & Pearson, 1933; Casella & Berger,
2002). However, here the denominator is not maximising
the likelihood over the alternative hypothesis H1 like in a
traditional Neyman-Pearson test, but instead the posterior
density p(θ|x) is maximised.
In the running example, θ is the effect size δ, the null
hypothesis value is δ0 = 0, and the MAP-based p-value
becomes
pMAP =
p(δ = 0|x)
arg max
δ∈R
p(δ|x) =
p(δ = 0|x)
p(δ = 0.41|x) ≈ 0.1076
Figure 4 visualises the MAP-based p-value: The solid blue
line is the posterior distribution’s value p(δ = 0|x) at the
null value δ = 0. The dashed red line is the posterior
distribution’s MAP value p(δ = 0.41|x) at the MAP value
δMAP = 0.41. The MAP-based p-value is the ratio between
these two values, and is significant if pMAP < 0.05.
As pMAP > 0.05, the null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 is not
rejected, similar to the idea behind traditional p-values.
Notice that the MAP-based p-value can only be used to
reject a null hypothesis H0 similar to traditional p-values.
It is not possible to confirm a hypothesis. Also, there is
by now no associated loss function which identifies the
MAP-based p-value as a Bayes rule which minimises the
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Figure 4. The MAP-based p-value for the effect size δ of the
two-sample Bayesian t-test in the running example. The solid
blue line shows the posterior distribution’s value p(δ = 0|x) at
the null value δ = 0. The dashed red line shows the posterior
distribution’s MAP value p(δ = 0.41|x) at the MAP value
δMAP = 0.41. The MAP-based p-value is given as the ratio
between these two values, and is significant if pMAP < 0.05.
expected loss under the selected loss function. Also, while
decision thresholds (or test levels α) of frequentist p-values
are theoretically justified to bound the type I error rate while
simultaneously minimising the type II error rate – leading to
the concept of uniformly most powerful (UMP) level α tests
(Neyman & Pearson, 1938; Casella & Berger, 2002) – there
is no analogue justification for choosing a specific threshold
for MAP-based p-values.
The probability of direction
The probability of direction (PD) is formally defined as
the proportion of the posterior distribution that is of the
median’s sign. Although expressed differently, this index
is strongly correlated to the frequentist p-value (Makowski
et al., 2019a).
In the running example, the posterior median of the effect
size δ is given as δMED = 0.41, which has a positive sign.
Therefore, the PD is simply the proportion of posterior
probability mass which is of a positive sign:
PD =
∫
R+
p(δ|x)dδ ≈ 0.9827
Figure 5 visualises the PD in the running example: The
blue dotted line separates positive from negative posterior
parameter values. The blue shaded area under the posterior
distribution is the proportion of posterior probability mass
which is of the median’s sign, which equals the PD. Based
on the PD one can test the null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 by
requiring a specified amount of posterior probability mass
to be strictly positive or negative. For example, if PD = 1,
all posterior parameter values are positive (or negative) and
rejection of H0 seems reasonable. In the running example,
more than 95% of the posterior indicate that there is a
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Figure 5. The probability of direction (PD) for the effect size δ
of the two-sample Bayesian t-test in the running example. The
blue dotted line separates posterior parameter values with a
positive and negative sign from each other. The shaded blue
area is the proportion of the posterior which is of the median’s
sign.
positive effect, and if one uses this threshold for deciding
between H0 and H1, H0 would be rejected.
However, similar to the MAP-based p-value there exists
no loss function which identifies the PD as a Bayes rule
which minimises the expected loss under the selected loss
function. Also, there are no theoretically justified thresholds
which makes the decision based on the PD arbitrary. Note
however that this criticism is also valid for Bayes factors and
the ROPE and HPD approach, as the selection of a specific
ROPE and HPD or the translation of different sizes of Bayes
factors into evidence is arbitrary, too (Tendeiro & Kiers,
2019).
The Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) and
the e-value
The Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) was developed
by Pereira and Stern (1999) as a Bayesian alternative to
frequentist significance tests employing the p-value. It was
designed to test a precise hypothesis.3 The FBST can be used
with any standard parametric model, where θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rp is a
(possibly vector-valued) parameter of interest, p(x|θ) is the
likelihood and p(θ) is the prior distribution.
A precise hypothesis H0 makes the statement that the
parameter θ lies in the corresponding null set ΘH0 . For point
null hypotheses like H0 : θ = θ0 the null set simply is given
as ΘH0 = θ0. The idea of the FBST is to use the e-value,
which quantifies the Bayesian evidence against H0 as a
Bayesian replacement of the traditional p-value. To construct
the e-value, Stern & Pereira (2020) defined the posterior
surprise function s(θ):
s(θ) :=
p(θ|x)
r(θ)
(5)
The surprise function normalises the posterior distribution
p(θ|x) by a reference function r(θ). Possible choices include
a flat reference function r(θ) = 1 or any prior distribution
p(θ) for the parameter θ, that is: r(θ) = p(θ). In the first
case, the surprise function becomes the posterior distribution
p(θ|x), and in the second case parameter values θ with
a surprise function s(θ) ≥ 1 indicate that they have been
corroborated by the data x, while parameter values θ with
a surprise function s(θ) < 1 indicate that they have become
less probable a posteriori. The supremum s∗ is then defined
as the supremum of the surprise function s(θ) over the null
set ΘH0 which belongs to the hypothesis H0 :
s∗ := s(θ∗) = sup
θ∈ΘH0
s(θ)
Pereira & Stern (1999) then defined the tangential set T (ν)
to the hypothesis H0 as
T (ν) := Θ \ T (ν)
where
T (ν) := {θ ∈ Θ|s(θ) ≤ ν}
T (s∗) includes all parameter values θ which are smaller or
equal to the supremum s∗ of the surprise function under the
null set, and T (s∗) includes all parameter values θ which are
larger than the supremum s∗ of the surprise function under
the null set.
The last step towards the e-value is then to define the
cumulative surprise function W (ν)
W (ν) :=
∫
T (ν)
p(θ|x)dθ (6)
and setting ν = s∗, W (s∗) is simply the integral of the
posterior distribution p(θ|x) over T (s∗). The Bayesian
e-value, which measures the evidence against the null
hypothesis H0, is then defined as
ev(H0) := W (s∗) (7)
where W (ν) := 1−W (ν). The left plot in figure 6
visualises the FBST and the e-value ev(H0) in the running
example. As previously, the dashed line shows the C(0, 1)
Cauchy prior on the effect size δ, and the solid line is the
resulting posterior distribution p(δ|x).
A flat reference function r(δ) = 1 was selected, so that
the posterior surprise function s(δ) becomes the posterior
distribution p(δ|x).
The supremum of the surprise function s(δ) over the null
set ΘH0 = {δ0} becomes s∗ = 0, because H0 : δ = δ0 with
δ0 = 0. Therefore, the null set ΘH0 = {δ0} includes only the
single value δ0 = 0, which then also is the supremum. The
blue point visualises the value s∗ = s(0) ≈ 0.2171.
The tangential set T (s∗) is then simply the set of
parameter values which satisfy s(δ) > s(0) (that is, s(δ) >
0.2171)), and the horizontal blue dashed line shows the
boundary between parameter values δ with s(δ) > s(0)
3Formally, Pereira et al. (2008) referred to a sharp hypothesis which is
defined as any submanifold of the parameter space of interest. This includes
for example point hypotheses like H0 : δ = 0 or in general hypotheses
which consist of a set of lower dimension than the parameter space.
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Figure 6. The FBST and the e-value ev(H0) against H0 when using a flat reference function r(δ) = 1 (left) and a wide Cauchy
reference function r(δ) = C(0, 1) (right) for the Bayesian two-sample t-test; In both cases, a wide C(0, 1) prior was assigned to the
effect size δ; the blue shaded area is the integral over the tangential set T (0) against H0 : δ = 0, which is the e-value ev against
H0; the red area is the integral over T (0), which is the e-value ev(H) in favour of H0 : δ = 0
(that is, s(δ) > 0.2171)) and s(δ) ≤ s(0) (that is, s(δ) ≤
0.2171)).
The value of the cumulative surprise function W (s∗) =
W (0.2171) :=
∫
T (0.2171)
p(θ|x)dθ is then visualised as the
red shaded area under the posterior, which is the integral of
the posterior over all parameter values δ which are smaller or
equal to s∗ = s(0) = 0.2171.
The e-value ev(H0) against H0 is then given as
W (s∗) = 1−W (s∗) = 1−W (s(0)), which is the integral
of the posterior over all parameter values δ which are
larger than s∗ = s(0) = 0.2171, visualised as the blue
shaded area under the posterior. In the running example,
ev(H0) = 0.9659, which means that 96.59% of the posterior
distribution’s parameter values attain a larger posterior
density value than the null value δ0 = 0. As a consequence,
the null hypothesis H0 traverses (or is located) in a low
posterior density region, and the Bayesian evidence against
H0 : δ = 0 is substantial. If one would use a threshold of
95%, one could reject the null hypothesis H0 based on the
e-value in the running example.
The right plot in figure 6 shows the surprise function s(δ)
when a wide Cauchy prior p(δ) = C(0, 1) is selected as
reference function r(δ). The resulting e-value against H0 in
this case is ev(H0) = 0.9743.
Notice that formally, the e-value ev(H0) supporting H0 is
obtained as ev(H0) := 1− ev(H0). However, the Bayesian
evidence for H0, the e-value ev(H0) is not evidence against
H1, because H1 is not even a sharp hypothesis.4.
Also, it is not possible to use the e-value ev(H0) to confirm
H0 in the sense of a Bayes factor or ROPE. For details see
Kelter (2020a). Nevertheless, one can use ev(H0) to reject
H0 if ev(H0) is sufficiently small, and there are asymptotic
arguments based on the distribution of ev(H0) which make
it possible to obtain critical values to reject a hypothesis H0
similar to p-values in frequentist significance tests (Stern &
Pereira, 2020). Therefore, in practice, one could alternatively
use these critical values of the distribution of ev(H0) instead
of using an (arbitrary) threshold like 95% for ev(H0) as used
above.
In summary, the FBST and the e-value were designed to
mimic a frequentist significance test of a precise hypothesis.
The e-value ev(H) can be interpreted as a direct replacement
of the frequentist p-value and can only be used to reject a
null hypothesisH0 of interest. The confirmation of a research
hypothesis via ev(H) is not possible (Kelter, 2020a; Stern &
Pereira, 2020).
However, the FBST has appealing properties: First, it
is “Bayesian” in the sense that its inference procedure
can be derived by minimising an appropriate loss function
(Madruga et al., 2001; Madruga et al., 2003). Second, the e-
value is explicitly invariant under suitable transformations on
the coordinate system of the parameter space (Pereira, Stern
& Wechsler, 2008). Third, the FBST works in the original
parameter space and encounters no problem when nuisance
parameters are present (Stern & Pereira, 2020, Section 3.1).
In contrast, the computation of the marginal likelihoods for
obtaining the Bayes factor can quickly become difficult in
these situations. Also, the FBST and e-value have been
widely applied in a variety of scientific domains over the last
two decades (Stern & Pereira, 2020). Interestingly, the FBST
has to our best knowledge not been applied in psychology so
far.
Comparison
Table 2 shows a comparison of the various available posterior
indices for hypothesis testing in the Bayesian paradigm.
The first thing to note is that the various available posterior
indices differ in their typical research question. For example,
the Bayes factor BF01 measures the relative change in
4See Definition 2.2 in Pereira et al. (2008).
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Table 2. Comparison of different Bayesian posterior indices for hypothesis testing
Posterior
index
Typical research question Can be used
for...
Benefits Limitations
Bayes fac-
tor
Which change in relative
beliefs about both hypothe-
ses H0 and H1 is required
after observing the data x?
X Confirmation
X Rejection
of a hypothesis
X Can be derived as an
explicit Bayes’ rule
X Easy to interpret and
well-established
7 Scales for
interpretation are
arbitrary
7 Computation of
marginal likelihoods can
be difficult in presence
of nuisance parameters
ROPE Is the parameter θ practi-
cally equivalent to values
inside the ROPE R?
X Confirmation
X Rejection
of a hypothesis
X Can be derived as an
explicit Bayes’ rule
X Easy to interpret
X Allows to establish bio-
equivalence which is more
realistic than testing for
precise effects
7 Selection of default
ROPEs is not straightfor-
ward for all parameters
7 Cannot measure evi-
dence once the HPD
has concentrated entirely
inside or outside the
ROPE
MAP-
based
p-value
How probable is null value
θ0 compared to the MAP
value θMAP?
7 Confirmation
X Rejection
of a hypothesis
X Allows seamless transi-
tion from p-values
X Easy to compute
7 Is no explicit Bayes’
rule
7 No theoretically justi-
fied thresholds are avail-
able
PD Is the parameter θ positive or
negative?
X Confirmation
X Rejection
of a hypothesis
X Easy to interpret
X Easier to obtain than all
other indices
7 Is no explicit Bayes’
rule
7 Limited usefulness as
only the direction of an
effect is captured
FBST and
e-value
How large is the Bayesian
evidence against H0?
7 Confirmation
X Rejection
of a hypothesis
X Can be derived as an
explicit Bayes’ rule
X Allows seamless transi-
tion from p-values while fol-
lowing the likelihood princi-
ple
X Invariant under reparam-
eterisations and is not trou-
bled by nuisance parameters
7 Does not allow to
confirm a hypothesis
beliefs towards H0 relative to H1 necessitated by observing
the data x, while the PD answers the question if the
parameter is of positive or negative sign (or equivalently,
if an effect is positive or negative). The MAP-based p-
value and the FBST and e-value both target the evidence
against a null hypothesisH0, while the ROPE can answer the
question if the parameter of interest is practically equivalent
to the values specified by the ROPE R. As a consequence,
if the goal of a study is the rejection of a null hypothesis,
the natural candidates are the FBST and e-value and the
MAP-based p-value. However, as the FBST and e-value is
theoretically much better justified we recommend to use the
FBST in these situations. An alternative is given by the
Bayes factor which can also reject a null hypothesis H0 by
indicating a strong necessity of a change in relative beliefs
towards H0.
If on the other hand, the goal is the confirmation of a
research hypothesis H0 or the confirmation of a theory, the
Bayes factor and the ROPE are natural candidates. Both
posterior indices allow for confirmation of H0 and if the
hypothesis is precise, the Bayes factor should be preferred.
However, if there are reasons to assume that the existence
of a precise effect is unrealistic, the ROPE may be more
appropriate. Note that Stern & Pereira (2020) remark
concerning future research: “In the context of information
based medicine (...) it is important to compare and test
the sensibility and specificity of alternative diagnostic tools,
access the bio-equivalence of drugs coming from different
suppliers (...)” (Stern & Pereira, 2020, p. 9). While Kelter
(2020a) recently investigated the specificity of various
Bayesian posterior indices including the e-value, judging
the bio-equivalence of drugs seems possible easily via the
ROPE and HPD approach proposed by Kruschke (2018),
see also the U.S. FDA industry guidelines for establishing
bioequivalence (2001).
These recommendations offer guidance in determining
default ROPEs, and in cases where no default ROPEs
are well-established, it should be possible to determine a
reasonable region of practical equivalence by incorporating
available knowledge of prior studies and the measurement
precision. For example, if similar research has yielded a
specific range of parameter estimates, these can be used
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to determine a ROPE. Also, if measurements are taken
with a specific precision (e.g. due to technological or
biochemical properties) the ROPE can be determined based
on which values can not be differentiated in practice due
to finite measurement precision. Also, prior subject-domain
knowledge may help in constructing a ROPE, for example,
based on biochemical or physiological aspects which help
in determining which parameter values can be treated as
practically equivalent. For example, different blood pressure
values are in practice separated only up to a specific
precision.
Formally, the PD can also be used to confirm a hypothesis,
but it is assumed that in most cases researchers are less
interested in stating only the direction of an effect but much
more in quantifying its size. As the PD is primarily targeted
in answering the question of whether an effect’s sign is
positive or negative, we do not recommend it over the Bayes
factor or ROPE.
The benefits and limitations listed in table 2 also should be
considered when choosing an appropriate index in practice.
Next to the research goal and study design which narrow
down the set of suitable candidates, the interpretation,
computation and theoretical properties should be taken into
account.
For example, the Bayes factor, ROPE and FBST can be
derived by minimisation of an appropriate loss function,
making them a “Bayesian” procedure. In contrast, the PD and
the MAP-based p-value are justified more heuristically. On
the other hand, the interpretation of the PD and MAP-based
p-value is much easier compared to the FBST or ROPE.
Some indices like the FBST and e-value and the MAP-
based p-value allow a seamless transition from NHST and p-
values as they are designed to mimic p-values. Other indices
require more sophisticated methodological shifts, like the
Bayes factor or the ROPE.
Computational aspects also play a role: While all indices
are in some form based on the posterior distribution
visualised in figure 2, the computation, in general, can
become difficult. For example, advanced computational
techniques like bridge sampling or the Savage Dickey
density ratio may be necessary when no analytic solutions are
available for the Bayes factor. In contrast, the FBST requires
only numerical optimisation and integration (although this
can become difficult in high-dimensional models, too).
However, for most standard models used in psychology, all
posterior indices discussed can be obtained with moderate
computational effort (Makowski et al., 2019b; Kelter,
2020a).
Discussion
Hypothesis testing stays an essential statistical method in
psychology and the cognitive sciences. The debate about
null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) goes on, and
the existing problems are far from being solved (Pashler
& Harris, 2012; Open Science Foundation, 2020; Matthews
et al., 2017). Among the proposed solutions to the replication
problems in psychology caused by the inappropriate
use of significance tests and p-values is Bayesian data
analysis (Wagenmakers et al., 2016; van Dongen et al.,
2019). However, practical Bayesian hypothesis testing in
psychology is challenged by the availability of various
posterior indices for significance and the size of an
effect. This complicates Bayesian hypothesis testing because
the availability of multiple Bayesian alternatives to the
traditional p-value causes confusion which one to select in
practice and why.
In this paper, various Bayesian posterior indices which
have been proposed in the literature were compared and their
benefits and limitations were discussed. Also, guidance on
how to select between different Bayesian posterior indices
for hypothesis testing in practice was provided.
To conclude, redirect attention to the running example.
Based on the running example, the Bayes factor was
indecisive. The ROPE did neither reject the null hypothesis
nor accept it, although it only slightly failed to reject the
null hypothesis. The MAP-based p-value also did not reject
the null hypothesis. The probability of direction expressed
strong evidence that the null hypothesis H0 : δ = 0 is not
true. The FBST also expressed strong evidence against the
null hypothesisH0 : δ = 0. However, both the PD and FBST
were not certain (and for the FBST it would also have been
possible to use the distribution of the e-value instead). How
should one interpret the differences obtained by employing
the various Bayesian posterior indices? One option is to hand
off this problem to statisticians and to prompt them to agree
on one single measure to use in practice. This is probably
not going to happen anytime soon, so the second (and more
appealing) option is to incorporate the study design and
research goal into the decision which index to use.
In the running example, a Bayesian two-sample t-test was
carried out and it was intentionally not stated (1) what kind of
data was measured and (2) what the existence of an “effect”
describes. For example, if data observed in both groups is the
blood pressure which is measured via a standard procedure
up to a specific precision, an effect may be described as
the difference in average blood pressure between a treatment
group taking a drug for lowering blood pressure and a control
group. In such a setting, it seems unrealistic to assume
the existence of an exact null effect δ = 0 (even if the
drug works, some difference between both groups is to be
expected). It is more appropriate to employ the ROPE R =
[−0.1, 0.1] to test if the effect size is practically equivalent
to zero.
Consider a different study design in which the participants
in both groups are partnered. Data measured in the first
group is the height in inches of each study participant. Each
participant in the second group now guesses the height in
inches of her partner without seeing her. The null hypothesis
H0 : δ = 0 states that participants in the second group have
the ability of extrasensory perception and can perfectly
determine their partner’s height without having seen them
previously. In this case, a precise null hypothesis H0 : δ =
0 is reasonable and when the goal is a rejection of this
hypothesis, the FBST or MAP-based p-value could be used.
If in contrast, the goal is the confirmation (or the goal is not
specified as confirmation or rejection), the Bayes factor could
be used.
The differences obtained by using the various available
posterior indices for the same running example are therefore
no contradictions to each other, but much more the results of
the different assumptions each method makes. The suitability
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of a given index to a study or experiment depends on both on
the experimental design and the research goal.
Notice that we do not advocate against or in favour of the
general use of one of the available indices. However, we want
to draw attention to two posterior indices which have been
widely underutilised in psychological research.
First, in a variety of situations, the ROPE seems to be
appropriate by not making the often unrealistic assumption
of an exact effect. This property is appealing in particular
in psychological research, as often some kind of effect is
expected to be observed only due to the randomness and
noise in the experimental data. Also, for effect sizes and
regression coefficients there exist plausible default values
and the procedure can be identified as a formal Bayes’ rule.
Second, the FBST is an appealing option when
transitioning from NHST and p-values to Bayesian statistics.
To our knowledge, the FBST is still widely underused
in psychological practice. Also, the ROPE is still widely
underused, although the situation is a little better than for
the FBST.
This situation may be attributed to the more statistical
background of the FBST and the relatively new proposal
of the ROPE, but also the lack of easy-to-apply software
implementations (Makowski et al., 2019b; JASP Team,
2019; van Doorn et al., 2019; Kelter, 2020c; Kelter, 2020d).
However, applying any of the discussed indices in this paper
is straightforward as shown in the OSF supplemental file, and
we encourage readers to reproduce all analyses and results.
Based on the recommendations given, readers can decide
themselves which index is most useful and makes the most
sense in their study or experiment. The guidance provided
here also shows that future research needs to be conducted
which analyses how the various indices relate to each other
both theoretically and in practice (Makowski et al., 2019a;
Kelter, 2020a).
In summary, this paper hopefully guides how to select
between different Bayesian posterior indices for hypothesis
testing in psychology and fosters critical discussion and
reflection when considering hypothesis testing in the
Bayesian.
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